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Historical & contemporary 
THE PURPOSE of this lecture is, firstly, to outline the history of republican 
interventions in the electOral process and, secondly, to explain why the Republican 
Movement, in this phase of the struggle, is _ becoming increasingly involved in 
elections as part ·of the overall strategy ~or ultimate victory in ~ur_ war of national 
and social liberation. 
The reader should note that these interventions were successf~I or unsuccessful depend-
·ing on the prevailing mood· a111ongst the people, e.g. in 1918 it was successful because of the 
· People's resistance to conscription and because of the growing awareness of the people to the 
sacrifices of 1916. · · 
In 1·921, interventions were unsuccessful because of the major· rifts i·n the republican camp 
and the demoralisation that this engendered ~mongst the p~opl·e. In 1981 they were succ~ss-
ful because of the sacrifices of our comrades in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh. · 
The IR B were the first recognisable republican organisation to- contest British elections when 
Charles Kickham and O'Donovan Rossa, whilst political prisoners, w~re elected to Westminster. 
Five years later in 1874, John Mitchel was returned as MP for North Tipperary and. Cork 
City but was stood down _ by the British under the Treason and Felon ·Act, the same law· being 
used to unseat Phil Clarke in Fermanagh/South Tyrone in 1955 and a so·mewhat similar move 
in Fermanagh/South Tyrone after the election of Bobby Sands in 1981. 
During the 1870s the Home Rule movement emerged. They believed in a federal system 
within the country under a Home Rule arrangement with England. Isaac Butt led this move-
111ent and after the 1874 election he was returned to Westminster· with -nearly 60 colleagues. 
They pursued a totally reformist and constitutional position in r~lation to British imperialism. 
Their only real saving grace in r-elation to the prevailing republican attitudes was that they 
supported amnesty for the Fenian POWs. 
However, in 1875, Joseph Biggar MP (who was a member of the Supreme Council of the . 
I RB) initiated a policy of obstructionism in Westminster. On the evening __ ·when ·Parnell took 
his seat, Biggar 'entertained' the British parliament for four hours on the subject of swine 
fever! · 
Thereafter, Parnell and Biggar joined forces to stop any business being carried out in West-
minster. This tactic won the support of militant nationalists and, in particular, Clann na Gael,_ 
the American leadership of th·e IR B. However, after discussions between various leading Fenians 
and Parnell, · it soon emerged that · Charles Stewart Parnell was not committed to the ideal of 
the complete separation of Ireland from England. 
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In Paris, in January 1869, the IRB Supreme Council rejected any alliances with constitutional 
forces but left the way open for individual members to participate in political activity on a 
strictly abstention ist basis. . 
The lesson to be derived from this parting of the ways between the Home Rule constitution-
alists and the I RB separatists is that the former were parliamentarians who happened to be 
Irish, and the latter were revolutionaries who were in parliament because it was there the 
revoluti.onary work of the moment was to be done. 
In this century, republican intervention in the British electoral process goes back to Feb-
ruary 1917 when Sinn Fein contested a by-election in North Roscommon with Count Plun-
kett who was returned. Between February 1917 and the general election of December 1918 
Sinn Fein contested three more by-elections successfully: Joe MacGuinness POW, in Longford; 
de Valera POW, for Clare; and Cosgrave POW, for Kilkenny. 
Sinn Fein entered this general election on a clear policy of separatism, would refuse to 
attend Westminster and would form a purely Irish national assembly. 
The result of the election was that Sinn Fein won 73 seats, the nationalist Home Rule 
party 6 seats, and the unionists 26 seats. Of the 73 republicans elected, 26 were in jail and 
20 were on th·~ run. Those Who wer.e at liberty decided to convoke an Irish national assembly. 
Everyone elected in Ireland in 1918 was invited regardless of party. Only the 27 republicans 
at liberty responded and met in the Mansion House, Dublin, in January 1919 and constituted 
themselves as Dail Eireann. 
The Dail adopted the 'Democratic Programme' which · showed profoundly the influence of 
' 
·James Conn·olly, and Cathal Brugha was elected as acting president on the understanding that 
the positio.n·was to be held open for de Valera who was then in ja_il. 
Subsequent electoral. tests showed the populari~y of the republic du.ring· the height of the 
war between the I RA and British imperialism. In January 1920, out of 126 town and city 
councils, 72 went republican, 26 to republican/nationalist alliances, and 29 to unionists. In 
the 1921 general election, 130 republicans, 44 unionists, and 6 nationalists were elected (these 
_figures relate to the 26-county and the 6-county returns). .-· ~ 
The unionists formed Stormont which both Sinn Fein and the Irish Nationalist Party boy-
cotted. Partition was now a reality. 
Sinn Fein split on the Treaty with 64 TDs voting for acceptance and 57 voting against. So, 
by a majority of 7, the republic was betrayed. 
Since partition has been imposed on us, the Republican Movement has had a consistent 
policy of contesting elections in both the Free State and the militarily-occupied 6 counties.,_ 
In June 1922, a general election was held in the 26 counties. There were 128 seats and the result ~ 
' was 58 pro-Treaty, 36 anti-Treaty, 17 Labour, 7 Farmers, and 10 independents. 
The anti-Treaty TDs boycotted this illegal assembly but all the other parties attended. 
After the Civil War ended, in May 1923, the Free Staters called another election in August 
1923. There were 153 seats available of which the republicans obtained 44 or 27 .5% of the · 
vote. 
Between 1923 and the next general election in 1927, de Valera had split from Sinn Fein 
and formed Fianna Fail. Sinn Fein fought the 1927 elections and won seven seats. In July 
1927, O'Higgins, the Free State Minister of 'Justice~, was executed_. _Cosgrave's Free State 
government responded by bringing in an _ El€ctora1 Amend_ment Act -requiring all candidates 
to take an oath that they would attend if elected. This was dropped when Fianna Fail came 
to power in-1932. 
Sinn Fein contested various by-elections including Louth ~nd Clare in the 1954 general 
election. But in 1957 Sinn Fein entered the general election fray In earnest, contesting 19 
constituencies, and were successful in 4 areas (the first time Sinn Fein had won sea~ts in the 
Free State since 1927). These areas and candidates were: Monaghan, F. O'Hanlon; South 
. Kerry, _J.J. Rice; Longford/\Nestmeath, R. O BradajgJi; ~nd Sligo/Leitrim. J. J. McGir1. The 
I RA campaign was in full swing at this stage which shows that armed propaganda has. an -en-
hancing effect on our electoral successes. 
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elected for Longford/Westmeath, 1957 elected for Sligo/Leitrim, 1957 
In 1961, we contested 21 constituencies and lost the four seats which we had gained '· in 
1957. Seamus Costello contested Wicklow for Sinn Fein in 1968 but vvas defeated. · 
-Our next electoral intervention in the Free State in a general election was in 1981 under 
the auspices of the H-Block campaign when POWs in the Blocks stood as candidates WJth 
Kieran Doher~y being elected in ·Cavan/Monaghan and Paddy Agnew ele,cted in Louth. This 
intervention effectively desta~ilised the Free State government and forced an early geh~ral 
election in 19B2 in which Sinr Fein participated but failed to win any seats. 
Sinn Fein have conslstentiy fought local elections in the Free State and in 1979 Won 30 seats 
at this level which makes us~ the fourth ·largest party at local · leve~. ·.. · 
In the occupied 6 counties, since partition we have fought both Stormont and Westminster 
elections. In 1925 we won two seats for Stormont and in 1933 we ~on a seat in South Armagh, · 
Paddy McLogan being the successful· candidate~ 
. It Wasn't until 1950 that we stood again, this fime Jn a We-stminster election when we con-
tested all 12 constituencies without success. In 1955 we again ~ontested the Westminster 
elections and this time we won two seats, one in Fermanagh/South Tyrone and the other in 
Mid-Ulster. We contested also in '56, '59, '64, and '66, ·but failed to either hold or win any 
seats. 
Our next intervention at this level-.was when the late Bobby Sands was elected in Fermanagh/ 
South Tyrone in a massive show of solidarity with the hunger·strike by the nationalist people. 
After Bobby Sands was murdered, his election agent, Owen Carron, stood and, despite the 
intervention of the - pro-unionist Sticks, was returned with an increased majority .. This was a 
- -good indication of the basic soundness of the nationalist people in the occupied zone. 
Up until the 1981 ard fheis, Sinn Fein had a policy position in relation to participating in 
local elections in the 6 counties but the-way is now open to us to contest these elections. 
This section of the lecture outlines the political reasons for involvement in the 
electoral p~ocess. 
The whole question now facing us is do we or do we not participate in elections? If so, 
what are our objectives in doing so? Firstly, it must be stated that we do not approach elections 
from a reformist viewpoint - we do not believe that the 6 counties can be 'democratised'. 
The hunger-stri-ke experience in particular has shown us the collabbrationist role which the 
.... .. ... . 
-S.DLP and ~the like~.Qf Gerry Fitt pfay in propping YP imperialism in the six counties. Similar-~y, 
-
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e The election interventions of Bobby Sands (top left} and Kieran Doherty (bottom left) in the. 1981 
Westminster and Leinster House elections generated further publicity for the republican cause. Following 
the death of Bobby Sands his election agent, Owen Carron (right), was elected with an increased majority. 
in the Free State the role of the establishment parties showed that they were more interested 
in defeating republicanism than in saving the lives of the hunger-strikers, yet a substantial 
section of the people sup·ported the H-Block campaign which in turn increased support for 
the republican cause. 
... 
There is a need for us to give the nationalist and republican people an opportunity of show-
ing whether they support the pro-imperialist policies of the establishment parties or the radical 
republicanism of the 1980s which demands the establishment of a democratic, socialist republic 
which is run by and for the people. 
There is a fundamental need for republicans to create the conditions whereby the Irish 
people may seize political and economic control of their own destinies. 
The I RA has and is bringing forward the war against the military might of Britain. Sinn 
Fein recognises and supports the right of the Irish people to resist the imperialist occupation. 
Sinn Fein must exploit the political and economic contradictions of partition. 
The most important thing, from Sinn Fein's point of view, is to involve ourselves in a cam-
paign of economic resistance against the economic imperialism and domination wh·ich prevails 
in all parts of th.e country. To do th is we must be with the people in their everyday struggles 
against the effects of capitalism and repression on their lives. · 
If we can successfully do this at local level and build ourselves up it will be reflected in 
. electoral victories. We must not do this from any cynical motivation but from a genuine con-
cern about the plight of our people. 
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